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Abstract
It is well known that rational bubbles can be sustained in balanced
growth path of a deterministic economy when the return to capital r is
equal to the growth rate g. When there is a lack of stores of value, bub-
bles can implement an e¢ cient allocation. This paper considers a world
where r uctuates over time due to shocks to the marginal productivity
of capital. Then, bubbles further e¢ ciency, though they cannot imple-
ment rst best. While bubbles can only be sustained when r = g in
a deterministic economy, r > g "on average" in a stochastic economy.
Fiscal policy improves welfare by adding an extra asset. Where only
the elderly contribute to shifting resources between investment and con-
sumption in a bubbly economy, scal policy allows part of that burden to
be shifted to the young. Contrary to common wisdom, trade in bubbly
assets implements intergenerational transfers, while scal policy imple-
ments intragenerational transfers. Hence, while bubbles and scal policy
are perfect substitutes in the deterministic economy, scal policy domi-
nates bubbles in a stochastic economy. For plausible parameter values,
a higher degree of dynamic ine¢ ciency should lead to a higher sovereign
debt.
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1 Introduction
There is increasing concern that we may be in an era of secular stagnation in
which there is insu¢ cient investment demand to absorb all the nancial savings
done by households and corporations, even with interest rates so low as to risk
nancial bubbles.
Lawrence Summers, Boston Globe, April 11, 2014
Real interest rates have come down steadily over the past thirty years. This
phenomenon has been dubbed secular stagnation, see Richard Baldwin and Coen
Teulings (2014) and IMF (2014, Chapter 3) for an overview of this debate. High
precautionary saving in China, lower fertility and the increase in life expectancy
have increased the supply of savings. Lower growth, the steady drop in the
prices of capital goods, and a shift of economic activity towards IT with a low
demand for capital have reduced investment demand. These factors have caused
a worldwide decline in real interest rates, which has led to bubbles in asset prices.
This paper addresses the question whether bubbles add to the resilience of the
economy. We analyze this problem in a Walrasian world, where all markets are
perfectly competitive, where Says Law always holds and where expectations are
rational. We assume that monetary authorities, by some divine touch, are able
to avoid the zero lower bound for the nominal interest rate. The only missing
market is that for intergenerational transfers. Bubbles are shown to partly ll
the gap of this missing market.
Jean Tiroles (1985) celebrated paper on the feasibility of rational bubbles
is the starting point of our analysis. A bubbly asset is dened as an asset that
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commands a higher price than the NPV of its expected future dividends. Tirole
considers an overlapping generations model similar to that of Peter Diamond
(1965) and Olivier Blanchard (1985). He shows that rational bubbles can be
sustained along a balance growth path when the return on capital r is equal to
the real growth rate g. Suppose youngsters save a xed share of their income
for future consumption. They can either invest in capital for a return r or buy
a bubbly asset to be sold to the next generation. Since saving grows at rate g
along a balanced growth path, spending on the bubbly asset grows at a rate g.
When the supply of bubbly assets is xed, its price therefore increases at a rate
g. If r > g, buying bubbly assets would not be a protable strategy. If r < g,
nobody would invest in capital and its return would go up till either r = g or
there is no investment in capital at all. The condition r < g is Peter Diamonds
(1965) condition for dynamic ine¢ ciency; r < g is also Henry Aarons (1966)
condition for Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension systems to be more e¢ cient than
funded systems. Bubbles are a substitute for PAYG pensions: the young pay
the old either by buying their bubbly asset, or by the government taxing them
to pay pensions to the old. Though widely di¤erent from a nancial point of
view, both institutions yield the same allocation of resources.
The contribution of this paper is to consider the role of bubbles when r
varies over time due to shocks to the marginal productivity of capital, such that
the economy jumps back and forth between r = g and r > g. We analyze the
potential role of scal policy in this type of world. In Tiroles balanced growth
analysis analysis r is constant over time. Hence, either buying bubbly assets is
attractive (r = g), or it is not (r > g). The economy does not have to jump back
and forth between both states along a balanced growth path. In an economy
with shocks to the return to capital, jumping back and forth between both
regimes might be desirable. However, it poses its own problems. The problem
is similar to switching back and forth from a funded to a PAYG pension system.
Switching to a PAYG system (such as is attractive when switching from r > g
to r = g) is simple, since the stock of savings becomes available for current
consumption. Switching back from PAYG to a funded system is hard, since
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one cohort has to give up consumption to rebuild the capital stock. We show
that bubbly assets provide a useful instrument in this context. Suppose that r
is temporarily low due to an investment slump. Then, the young do not want
to invest all their savings in capital. Instead, they buy the bubbly asset. This
raises the price of this asset. Hence, the elderly, who hold these assets, receive a
windfall prot, which they spend on extra consumption. A reverse mechanism
occurs during an investment boom. The variation in the price of the bubbly
asset is therefore an instrument for shifting resources between consumption and
investment, depending on the return on productive investment, or equivalently,
it is an instrument for shifting aggregate consumption over time. Despite the
risk of a future capital loss, buying bubbly assets is a rational strategy for the
young.
The key contribution of the paper is to show the distinct role of scal pol-
icy in a world with unexpected shocks in the return to capital. In Tiroles
balance growth world, bubbles and scal policy are perfect substitutes. Every
additional dollar of sovereign debt reduces the value of the stock of bubbly as-
sets by one dollar. This perfect substitutability no longer holds in an economy
with unexpected shocks in r. Shifts between investment and consumption due
to variations in r are equivalent to shifts in consumption between generations.
One would expect that such shifts can only be implemented when enforced by
the government. However, trade in bubbly assets is shown to be a substitute
- albeit imperfect - for transfers enforced by the government. A bubbly equi-
librium is therefore more e¢ cient than the naive market equilibrium where all
assets are priced according to the NPV of the expected future dividends. How-
ever, bubbly assets do not allow the implementation of the rst-best allocation
of resources to consumption and investment (the latter statement is contingent
on the exact e¢ ciency concept applied as the wealth of various cohorts has to
be aggregated).
Even though bubbly assets are shown to further e¢ ciency by shifting re-
sources from investment to consumption during an investment slump and from
consumption to investment during a boom, a simple scal policy rule is shown
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to be superior to trade in bubbly assets. The drawback of relying on trade in
bubbly assets is that the elderly bear the full cost of adjustment. During an
investment slump, the price they get for their holding of bubbly assets is high.
Hence, they can consume more. The reverse holds during a boom. The full
burden of the variability of consumption falls therefore on the elderly. Fiscal
policy can share this burden between the young and the old. Consider a policy
rule where the government commits to issuing a xed amount of debt every
period. It repays the debt from the previous period by receipts of the sale of
new bonds this period. During an investment slump, the price of these bonds
is high (i.e. the interest-rate is low). Hence, the government runs a surplus on
its debt operations. This surplus is distributed among the young in the form of
a temporary tax relief. The young save part of this tax relief for consumption
during retirement, but another part will be spend on current consumption. The
latter part contributes to the shift of resources from investment to consumption.
This mechanism works the other way around during a boom. We enter a strange
world in which bubbles implement intergenerational transfers without enforce-
ment by the government, while scal policy is a prerequisite for implementing
intragenerational transfers. Fiscal policy can therefore improve welfare. Under
quite plausible parameter values, the level of sovereign debt should be set such
as to eliminate bubbles entirely and to let sovereign debt absorb all the excess
saving that gives rise to the dynamic ine¢ ciency. Hence, no bubbles would
emerge in this equilibrium.
We introduce the concepts of ex post and ex ante risk on the return on
productive investments. Ex post risk is the standard type of stochastic uncer-
tainty of which the realization is known only after the investment is made. It
makes productive investment a risky endeavour. In contrast, the realization of
ex ante risk is known at the moment that the investment is made. The part
that is unknown is the ex ante risk on tomorrows investment. This risk does
not a¤ect the return on todays productive investments, but it does a¤ect the
return on todays purchase of the bubbly asset, because tomorrows price of the
bubbly asset is negatively related to tomorrows expected return on productive
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investment, which depends on tomorrows ex ante risk.
Empirical research done after Tirole (1985) has cast doubt on the practical
relevance of his argument. Andrew Abel, Gregory Mankiw, Lawrence Summers
and Richard Zeckhauser (1987) showed that for an economy to be dynamically
ine¢ cient the capital sector must be a net sink: investment should exceed divi-
dends. They showed that this condition is violated empirically by a wide margin.
However, Francois Geerolf (2013) showed recently that when the criterion for
the existence of rents is corrected for some factors (like natural resources), the
economy might have been in a dynamic ine¢ cient state frequently. This paper
shows that when the economy switches back and forth between r = g and r > g,
the capital sector has positive outlays on average. Where Tiroles (1985) analy-
sis yields the conclusion that r = g is a prerequisite for the existence of rational
bubbles, this paper leads to the conclusion that bubbles guarantee that r > g
"on average".
We extend the analysis one step further by allowing for risk aversion. Then,
government debt also acts as an insurance device. Investing in sovereign debt
when young o¤ers a generation partial insurance to both the ex ante risk on
buying bubbly assets and the ex post risk on investing in capital when they are
old. The government charges an insurance premium on issuing these bonds that
allows it to run a decit "on average".
The condition of dynamic ine¢ ciency has been argued not to correspond to
what we usually associate with bubbly episodes. These episodes are character-
ized by high investment driven by waves of optimism, not by low investment, as
in Tiroles model. Alberto Martin and Jaume Ventura (2012) analyze a world
with distorted nancial markets where bubbles enable the transfer of wealth
from ine¢ cient to e¢ cient investors or where bubbles provide the collateral
needed to support these transfers, see their 2014 paper and also Ricardo Ca-
ballero, Emmanuel Farhi and Mohamad Hammour (2006). However, not all
bubbly episodes seem to support waves of high investment, consider, for ex-
ample, the analysis of the hike in oil prices just before the demise of Lehman
Brothers in 2008 by Caballero, Farhi, and Pierre Gourinchas (2008). Manuel
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Santos and Michael Woodford (1997) worked out in their paper the conditions
for the feasibility of rational bubbles.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 considers the simplest economy
that exhibits our mechanism. We use a convenient production function which
allows an analytical solution by ruling out complementarity between labour and
capital. The young save a xed amount, which can be stored either in capital
or in bubbly assets. The decision on how to store resources is the only margin
of adjustment. Section 3 presents the core argument regarding scal policy. It
extends the model of Section 2 by allowing for intertemporal substitution in con-
sumption and by introducing the trade-o¤ for a generation between consumption
today and consumption tomorrow. This model has essentially two parameters,
the average degree of dynamic ine¢ ciency when all savings are invested in cap-
ital  and the share  of lifetime wealth that is saved for retirement. These
parameters characterize the essential mechanisms in our model. The higher the
average degree of dynamic ine¢ ciency, the higher must be sovereign debt to
absorb excess saving. The lower , the higher the share of the young in lifetime
consumption and hence the larger the share of the burden cyclical adjustment
in consumption that should be attributed to them. This can be done by s-
cal policy only. Section 4 relaxes the assumption of risk-neutrality. Section 5
concludes.
2 The basic model
2.1 Core assumptions for all three models
The three models considered in this paper share a common set of assumptions.
We consider an economy that is populated by overlapping generations living for
two periods. During each period, a cohort of elderly dies, while a new young
cohort enters the economy. In the rst stage of their life, when young, this cohort
works and receives labour income. In the second stage, when old, the cohort
is retired and can only consume what is saved from the rst stage. We apply
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the maximum convenience principle in modelling. Without loss of generality,
we set the rates of population growth and technological progress equal to zero
(hence: g = 0). The size of each cohort is normalized to unity. The young
have two options for storing resources for consumption in the second stage of
life: investing in vineyards or buying the bubbly asset. Their rst option, to
invest in vineyards, we refer to as productive investment. These investments
are depleted in one period and yield a physical return. Since investments are
fully depleted, investment is equal to the capital stock. Since g = 0, investing is
dynamically e¢ cient as long as one unit of investment yields a return of at least
one unit of output. Alternatively, they can buy a bubbly asset, which we refer
to as gold. Gold can neither be (re)produced nor become depleted. Its supply
is normalized to unity. Holding gold does not enter the utility function. Says
law holds in this economy, expectations are rational, and markets clear and are
perfectly competitive.
2.2 Assumptions for the basic model
In the basic model discussed in this section, the young save one unit of their
income for consumption in the second stage of their life. The rest is consumed
during the rst stage. Since the income and the share of saving of the young are
xed by assumption, their consumption is also xed. Hence, we focus entirely
on the consumption of the old. All agents are risk-neutral. Hence, expected
consumption of the old is a su¢ cient statistic for the utility of a generation.
Each member of a cohort owns a vineyard. When young, he chooses how
much to invest in his vineyard. The relation between the input of capital in
period t and output in period t+ 1 is given by a production function f ():
f (kt; ut) = ln (kt + ut) + g (ut) ; (1)
fk (kt; ut) = (kt + ut)
 1
;
for any kt + ut > 0; kt is capital per worker, 0  kt  1 (since the capital stock
can never exceed the available savings); g () is an arbitrary function, g ()  0; ut
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is an i.i.d. technology shock with support ut 2 [u ; u+], expectation E[ut] = 
and variance Var[ut] = 2.
This production function exhibits the standard feature of diminishing re-
turns to capital with a positive rst derivative and a negative second derivative,
fk (kt; ut) > 0 and fkk (kt; ut) < 0, where the subscript k refers to the partial
derivative with respect to k. The logaritmic functional form has the advantage
that it yields a closed-form solution for our model. Other functional forms, like
the standard f (kt; ut) = (kt + ut)
,  2 (0; 1), would yield similar results, but
no closed form solutions. Our production function is non-standard as it does
not allow complementarity between labour and capital. With complementarity,
investment of the current generation youngsters would have a positive external
e¤ect on wages of the next generation. Leaving out this complementarity elim-
inates this e¤ect. The technology shock ut is additively capital augmenting:
ut is a perfect substitute for capital. Due to diminishing returns on capital, a
higher ut reduces the return on capital for a given level of kt. A high value of
ut therefore leads to an investment slump, a low value to an investment boom.
The crucial feature of this economy is that ut captures ex ante investment
risk. Ex ante risk di¤ers from the standard ex post risk in that its realization is
known at the moment the young decide on how much to invest in their vineyard.
Ex post risk is irrelevant in the current model with risk-neutrality. It will be
introduced in Section 4, where we allow for risk aversion.
The function g (ut) plays no role in the analysis. It has been added here
merely to show that the model can handle di¤erent types of technology shocks.
Suppose g (ut) = 0 for all ut. Then output is an increasing function of ut: an
investment slump goes hand-in-hand with high levels of output. This is not
the way we tend to think about investment slumps. We can deal with that by
making g (ut) a declining function of ut, such that investment and output are
positively correlated. The only thing that matters for the analysis in this paper
is the investment part of the story. Hence, for the sake of notational convenience,
we set g (ut) = 0, noting that we can generate any desired correlation between
investment and output by a proper denition of g (ut).
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Since kt+ut > 0 must hold for ln (kt + ut) to be dened, and since kt 2 [0; 1],
we must impose some constraints on the support of ut. Since kt  1, a necessary
condition is ut >  1, implying u  >  1. For all equilibria considered in this
paper the condition kt >  ut is satised. Since there is no growth in this
economy, g = 0, the Aaron/Diamond condition for dynamic ine¢ ciency r < g
reads r < 0. Since all capital is depleted in one period, the possibility of dynamic
ine¢ ciency requires that if all savings are invested in the worst state of nature,
kt = 1 and ut = u+, then the marginal return on capital must be less than one:
fk (1; u
+) < 1. Hence u+ > 0. This motivates the following assumption on the
upper and lower support of ut:
u  >  1; (2)
u+ > 0;
u  <  < u+:
The latter assumption follows immediately from the rst two, since the mean
must be an interior point of the support. The parameter  can therefore be
interpreted as the average share of savings that should not be invested in vine-
yards to maintain dynamic e¢ ciency. If  = 0, there is on average su¢ cient
investment demand to absorb the supply of savings.
Our model does not allow for autocorrelation in ut. Allowing for autocor-
relation is not di¢ cult in principle, but it would complicate the derivations
without a¤ecting the main conclusions. We have not been explicit about the
unit of time of our model, but the context of an overlapping generations model
where people live for just two periods means that the appropriate unit of time
is several decades. Then, the assumption of serial independence of subsequent
values of ut does not pose a serious problem.
Since Says law holds, the sum of the investment of the young in their vine-
yards, kt, and the consumption of the old, denoted ct, must be equal to the sum
of savings and the return on last periods investment minus current investment:
ct = 1 + f (kt 1; ut 1)  kt: (3)
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2.3 Characterization of the equilibrium
Let pt be the price of gold in period t. In each period, members of the young
generation must individually choose how much of their savings to invest in their
vineyard, kt. What is left is spent on gold. The young take this decision so as
to maximize their expected return in the second period, which satises:
kt = arg max
k
f (k; ut) + (1  k) Et [pt+1]
pt
;
where Et [x] denotes the expectation of x conditional on the information avail-
able at time t. The rst-order condition for the optimal portfolio composition
reads:
fk (kt; ut) =
Et [pt+1]
pt
: (4)
The expected return on gold should be equal to the marginal productivity of
capital. Market clearing on the market for gold requires that the young buy
the entire stock of gold from the old. Since the young spend 1  kt on gold and
since the supply of gold is equal to unity, we have:
pt = 1  kt: (5)
An equilibrium is a solution for pt and kt that satises the rst-order condition
(4) and the market-clearing condition (5).
Proposition 1 Equilibria for which Et [kt+1] does not depend on t.
1. There exists an equilibrium where kt = 1 and pt = 0 for all realizations of
ut.
2. If:
0 <  <
 
u+
 1
; (6)
then there exists a second equilibrium where:
kt = 1  
1 + 
(1 + ut) ; (7)
pt =

1 + 
(1 + ut) :
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3. If  > 1=u+, then a similar equilibrium exists, but where investment is
constrained by the non-negativity constraint kt  0 in some states of na-
ture.
The proof of Proposition 1 is instructive, as the two equilibria follow natu-
rally as two distinct roots of a second-order polynomial in expected investment,
Et [kt+1].
Proof. Substitution of condition (5) into equation (4) yields:
(1  Et [kt+1]) (kt + ut) = 1  kt: (8)
Taking expectations conditional on the information available on t  1 yields:
(1  Et 1 [kt+1]) (Et 1 [kt] + ) = 1  Et 1 [kt] : (9)
Et 1 [kt] does not depend on the realization of any of the past or future shocks ut.
Hence, it is deterministic. Therefore Et 1 [kt+1] =Et [kt+1]. Since we consider
equilibria where Et [kt+1] does not depend on t, Et 1 [kt] =Et [kt+1] Using these
results, equation (9) yields an expression for Et [kt+1]:
0 = (1  Et [kt+1]) (Et [kt+1] +   1) :
This equation has two solutions, Et [kt+1] = 1 and Et [kt+1] = 1   . The rst
equilibrium follows immediately from the rst solution and equation (5). The
second equilibrium follows from the substitution of Et [kt+1] = 1  in equation
(8) and solving for kt. Substitution in equation (5) yields an expression for pt,
proving equation (7). Consider this equation in detail. Since agents cannot
be forced to sell their gold, the price of gold has to be positive in any state of
nature. Hence:  > 0. Furthermore, the following must hold: kt 2 [0; 1]. The
upper constraint is satised for all states of nature since u  >  1 by equation
(2). The lower constraint requires  < 1=u+. This proves condition (6).
Proposition 1 discusses two possible equilibria. In the rst equilibrium, the
young invest all of their savings in vineyards, even when this is dynamically
ine¢ cient. Hence, the price of gold is zero. Nobody nds it attractive to buy
gold, since its expected price - and therefore its current price - is zero.
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If equation (6) holds, there is a second equilibrium where people nd it at-
tractive to buy gold. We refer to this equilibrium as the bubbly equilibrium. In
this equilibrium, the young do not want to invest all their savings in vineyards
when the return on this investment is low. Instead, they buy gold as an alter-
native store of value. They do so because the expected price of gold is positive.
In equilibrium, the return on investment and the expected return on gold must
be equal. When the return on capital is temporarily low, the price of gold is
above its long-run equilibrium, since everybody wants to buy gold instead of
investing in vineyards. Hence, the expected return on buying gold is also low,
because people expect the price of gold to return to its long-run equilibrium,
Et [pt+1] = 1 Et [kt+1], satisfying the return equivalence condition (4). The
price of gold is a decreasing function of the investment in vineyards kt. Since
the expected price of gold is xed, the variation in the expected return on gold
is driven by variation in its current price.
The price of gold can never be zero in a bubbly equilibrium, since then
the expected return would be innite, which is inconsistent with the return
equivalence condition (4). Hence, even in an extreme investment boom, ut = u ,
not all saving is spent on productive investment, even though the return exceeds
unity. This is also the reason why condition (6),  > 0, is stricter than condition
(2), u+ > 0. Condition (2) only guarantees that there are some states of nature
where investing all savings in vineyards is ine¢ cient. Condition (6) requires
that investmenting all savings in vineyards is ine¢ cient for the "average" state
of nature. If not, the prospect of an investment slump would not be su¢ ciently
severe for youngsters to buy gold even in the best state of nature.1 In what
follows, we assume condition (6) to apply.2
1Condition (6) also imposes  < 1=u+. If this condition is violated, a bubbly equilibrium
exists, but investment is bound by the non-negativity constraint kt  0 in some states of
nature. Then all savings are spent on gold, leading to a messier description of the equilibrium.
Hence, we omit it. Note that the upperbound kt  1 is never binding, since the young always
spend some savings on gold.
2Since  < u+, the condition  <
 
u+
 1 implies  < 1.
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Ex ante risk in investment leads to ex post risk in the price of gold in a
bubbly equilibrium: even though the current return on investment is known,
the return on gold is uncertain, due to uncertainty about the future return on
investment.
Proposition 1 focusses on equilibria where Et [kt+1] is constant over time.
There are other equilibria, where Et [kt+1] varies over time, see e.g. Tirole
(1985) for a discussion in the context of a deterministic equilibrium. There
are sunspot equilibria and there are asymptotically bubbleless equilibria, where
r < g. Then, the no arbitrage condition implies that the value of bubble declines
gradually. A similar asymptotically bubbleless equilibrium can be expected to
exist in this stochastic economy with random shocks to the product of capital.
In that case, Et [kt+1] would gradually increase over time towards unity. This
type of equilibrium is not essential for the argument on scal policy in the next
section. Hence, I do not discuss them here.
We refer to the rst equilibrium as the naive equilibrium, because it is un-
likely that agents coordinate on this equilibrium when the bubbly equilibrium
exists. As soon as we enter a bubbly world, where the expected price of gold is
positive, Et [pt+1] > 0, each individual agent is strictly worse o¤ by not buying
gold up till the point where the expected return on gold is equal to the return to
investment in vineyards. Buying gold is therefore a rational decision even when
everybody is aware that it is a bubbly asset. For this reason, an asymptotically
bubbleless equilibrium is hard to justify. If we start to coordinate on believes
that bubbly assets carry value in the rst place, then why would we believe
that the value of these assets will gradually decline? This holds a fortiori be-
cause bubbles satisfy a real demand for store of value during investment slumps.
Thereby, they further e¢ ciency, see Proposition 3 below. When bubbles vanish
asymptotically, so would the e¢ ciency gain.
Tirole (1985) shows that in a deterministic model, bubbles can only be sus-
tained when r = g. Does this condition carry over to the stochastic model
considered in this paper? Since the return on capital varies over time, we have
to account for this variability. Hence, we investigate whether the expected re-
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turn on capital satises this condition. Similarly, Abel et.al. (1987) show that
permanent bubbles and permanent dynamic ine¢ ciency would require the cap-
ital sector to be a net sink: investment should exceed capital outlays. The
subsequent proposition shows that the expected return on capital is positive,
r > g, and that the capital sector has on average net positive outlays.
Proposition 2 The expected return on capital.
1. E

f 1kt

= 1:
2. E[fkt] > 1:
3. E[fkt  kt] E[kt] > 0:
where fkt  fk (kt; ut).
Proof. The rst statement follows directly from equation (4); the second from
Jensens inequality: Et

f 1kt

Et [fkt] > 1; the third from
E [fkt  kt]  E [kt] =

E

1 + 
1 + ut

  1

E [kt] + Cov

1
1 + ut
; ut

:
The rst term is positive, by Jensens inequality; the second term is also positive,
since both stochasts depend negatively on ut.
Proposition 2 shows that the results of Tirole and Abel et.al. do not apply
"on average" in this economy. Rational bubbles exist even though the expected
return on capital is positive and even though the capital sector has positive net
outlays on average. The intuition behind the third result is that a technology
shock is partially undone by lower investment. Hence, investment and the return
on capital are positively correlated. This positive correlation causes the capital
sector to have a positive net outlay on average. Hence, where Tirole concludes
that bubbles can only be sustained when r = g, we conclude that the existence
of bubbly assets guarantees that "on average" r > g.
2.4 Welfare comparison
An analysis of the implication of bubbles for welfare requires the denition of a
proper criterion. The denition of welfare that we apply is expected utility of
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the young before the veil of ignorance about the ex ante risk ut is lifted: that
is, before the youngsters learn what prospects for productive investment their
cohort faces. Since the consumption of the young is xed, the rst-best policy
maximizes expected consumption of the elderly. Since we have no instruments
to transfer wealth between periods other than investment in vineyards, the only
decision we have to take is how much of the output generated in a particular
period should be invested in vineyards and how much should consumed by the
elderly. Since the former favours the young while the latter favours the elderly,
any change in the allocation implies a transfer of wealth between generations.
Since the rst-best investment rule k (ut) maximizes E[ct], equation (3) im-
plies
k (ut) = arg max
k
[1 + ln (k + ut)  k] :
Note that both kt and kt 1 enter equation (3), which depends on di¤erent
realizations of the technology shock, ut and ut 1 respectively. However, the
rule k (u) should apply likewise to both kt and kt 1. Since both terms enter
additively, we can take expectations for each term separately and add up the
expectations. This makes this formulation of the rst-best policy applicable.3
The rst-order condition implies
k (ut) = 1  ut: (10)
Since 0  k (ut)  1, this condition applies unconstrained in all states of na-
ture only if 0  u  < u+  1. This is a more stringent constraint than equations
(2) and (6). Again, dealing with the truncations at k (u) = 0 and k (u) = 1 is
straightforward in principle, but it messes up notation and provides no new in-
sights. Hence, we assume that this more stringent condition holds. Furthermore,
3A more formal treatment would observe that the accumulated welfare of all future gener-
ations satises
1t=0E [ct] = 
1
t=0 (E [ln (kt 1 + ut 1)] + E [1  kt]) :
Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to kt yields the same expression. The
problem with this specication is that 1t=0E[ct] does not converge. One could interpret this
specication as the limiting case for the discount rate going to zero.
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we assume that for any increasing function h (), E[h (ut)] = h () + 12h00 ()2
and Var[h (ut)] = h0 ()
2
2.4
The consumption ct that goes with this investment rule, see equation (3),
depends on the investment opportunities of the young. This outcome is similar
to a form of intergenerational insurance of the return on capital. If a generation
faces a low marginal return on investment due to a high realization of ut, then
the current generation of the elderly absorbs the excess saving by consuming
their windfall prot on bubbly assets. The young benet indirectly from this
obligation to hand over part of their savings to the current elderly without proper
compensation, because the same rule that forces them to do so in this period,
will apply also next period, when they are the potential beneciaries. The rst-
best allocation can therefore be implemented by an optimal Rawlsian insurance
policy that insures the young against the risk of a low return on productive
investment agreed upon before the veil of ignorance is lifted. Insurance pays
o¤ even in this world with risk-neutral agents, since it allows agents to avoid
having to make investments in vineyards when this is ine¢ cient.
The bubbly equilibrium is a compromise between the naive market equilib-
rium and the rst-best allocation: the coe¢ cient on ut in the expression for
kt is equal to zero in the naive equilibrium and equal to unity in the rst-best
equilibrium, while it is in between zero and unity in the bubbly equilibrium,
0 < 1+ < 1, see Proposition 1. Relative to the Rawlsian insurance policy,
the bubbly equilibrium provides partial insurance. If a generation faces a low
marginal return on capital, it invests less in its vineyards and spends more on
bubbly assets. This reduces the volatility in the return on capital, but does not
eliminate it. Full stabilization requires that kt varies more. Then, the market-
clearing condition pt = 1  kt implies that the price of gold should vary. Since
the expected return on gold varies inversely to the price of gold, and since this
return is equal to that on capital, this implies that the return on capital must
4This assumption says that E[h (ut)] and Var[h (ut)] are equal to the expressions derived
from second-order Taylor expansions. The assumption is not crucial, but we apply this second-
order expansion for comparative statics.
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vary. It is therefore less volatile than in the naive market equilibrium, but more
volatile than in the rst-best allocation, where the return on capital is constant,
fkt = 1.
A peak in gold prices leads to a boost in the consumption of the elderly.
Fluctuations in gold prices are therefore a means for adjusting the consumption
of the elderly to the level of productive investment set by youngsters. When in-
vestment of the young is high, consumption of the elderly should be low, and the
other way around. One would expect that this type of intergenerational transfer
could not be implemented without enforcement by the government. However,
bubbles are a substitute. The desire of the young to avoid unproductive invest-
ment by buying gold as an alternative store of value provides an enforcement
mechanism for a partial implicit insurance contract. The market provides a
second-best substitute for government-enforced intergenerational transfers in a
bubbly equilibrium that is not available in the naive equilibrium.
Proposition 3 The trade-o¤ between expected welfare and its variability.
1. The naive equilibrium yields the highest mean level of investment; mean
investment is the same in the rst-best and the bubbly equilibrium.
2. First best yields the highest expected welfare and the naive equilibrium the
lowest.
3. The ordering of the variability of welfare is the same.
Proof. Remember that expected consumption of the elderly is a su¢ cient sta-
tistic for welfare. Hence, we can use the expressions for E[ct] and Var[ct] to prove
the rst two statements. Using equation (3), Proposition 1 and equation (10),
one can derive the expressions presented in Table 1. Some simple calculations
using these expressions prove the proposition.
Table 1 Expectation and variance of welfare and investment
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equilibrium naive bubbly rst-best
ct ln (1 + ut) ln

1+ut
1+

+ 1+ (ut+1 + 1) ut 1
E[ct] ln (1 + )  12


1+
2
  12


1+
2

Var[ct] 1(1+)2
2 1+
2
(1+)2
2 2
kt 1
1
1+   1+ut 1  ut
E[kt] 1 1   1  
Var[kt] 0


1+
2
2 2
There is a trade-o¤ between expected welfare and its variability. Agents are
risk-neutral, so the variability does not come at a price in this economy. This
will change when we allow for risk aversion in Section 4. The sources of variation
di¤er between equilibria. In the naive market equilibrium, the variation comes
from the return on capital. In the rst-best equilibrium, the variation comes
from the investment in vineyards. The variation in the bubbly equilibrium is
a mixture of both. Investment is the highest in the naive market equilibrium,
since in that equilibrium agents have no alternative store of value. Remarkably,
average investment is the same in the bubbly and the rst-best equilibrium,
though investment is more volatile in the rst-best equilibrium. Hence, the
bubbly equilibrium features overinvestment when the return on capital is low
and underinvestment when the return is high.
3 Intertemporal substitution in consumption
3.1 Assumptions
The model of Section 2 constrained the problem to the allocation of current sav-
ing to either investment in vineyards (to the benet of the young) or consump-
tion (to the benet of the elderly). In practice, consumption can be transferred
between stages of life. This section introduces a trade-o¤ for the young between
consumption now and saving for future consumption. To x ideas, suppose that
agents are characterized by Epstein-Zin (1989) preferences with risk-neutrality
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within each period and Cobb Douglas preferences for intertemporal substitution:
U = (1  ) lnE [cyt ] +  lnE [ct+1] ; (11)
where cyt is the consumption of the young cohort entering the economy at t and
ct+1 is their consumption when they have grown old at t+1. The parameter  is
the budget share of consumption in the second period, 0 <  < 1. Epstein-Zin
preferences decouple the rate of intertemporal substitution from the degree of
risk aversion. This section maintains the assumption of risk-neutrality.
The Cobb Douglas structure for intertemporal substitution implies that in-
come and substitution e¤ects cancel, so that variations in the (expected) return
on capital do not a¤ect the budget share that the young set apart for future con-
sumption. Total labour income earned in the rst period of life is conveniently
assumed to be equal to  1, so that savings are equal to unity in a market
equilibrium, in both the naive and the bubbly equilibrium, as in the previous
section.
We can achieve an analytical solution only by using a simplication compared
to most of the literature. In an economy with constant returns to scale, the
investment in capital by the previous generation yields a positive externality
to the wage rate faced by the next generation. This externality is equal to
the di¤erence between the marginal and the intra-marginal return to capital.
It introduces a source of persistence: higher investment today yields higher
wages and hence higher savings next period. Our production function rules
out complementarity between labour and capital, but this raises the issue what
happens to the di¤erence between the marginal and the intra-marginal return to
capital. Here, we introduce a separate class of rentiers, who own the vineyards
and consume all the rents derived from their property, but who play no further
role in the economy. We assume that there is no market for vineyards.
Capital productivity is modelled in the same way as in the previous sec-
tion, except that vineyards are owned not by the population at large, but by a
separate class of rentiers. The di¤erence between the marginal and the intra-
marginal return, f (kt; ut) fk (kt; ut) kt, is the income of the rentier class, which
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plays no further role in the analysis.
3.2 Fiscal policy
Since income and substitution e¤ects cancel in the intertemporal trade-o¤ of
youngsters, the naive and the bubbly equilibrium are exactly the same as in
the previous section, apart from the di¤erence due to the introduction of a
separate rentier class. However, the extension of the model with intertemporal
substitution in consumption allows us to study the e¤ect of scal policy. We
consider a simple policy rule, where the government issues bonds at time t that
pay back one unit of consumption per bond at time t + 1. The government
commits to issue b bonds of this type each period. It sells them at a price qt,
which di¤ers between periods. Hence, the interest rate is equal to q 1t  1. Each
period, the government has to repay its debt b, but it receives bqt from new
bond issuance. The di¤erence between the two is covered by a tax zt on labour
income (or: subsidy, if qt > 1), which satises
zt = b (1  qt) : (12)
Lifetime wealth is equal to gross labour income  1 minus the tax on labour
income. Hence, agents consume an amount 1  (1  zt) when young and save
an amount 1 zt for future consumption. Hence, expected consumption of the
elderly at time t+ 1 evaluated at time t satises
Et [ct+1] = (1  zt)Et [Rt (s; g) + 1] ; (13)
Rt (s; g)  q 1t + s
 
fkt   q 1t

+ g
 
p 1t pt+1   q 1t
  1;
where s and g are the shares of savings held in investment and gold, respectively.
Note that Rt (g; s) 6=Et [Rt (g; s)], since Rt depends on ut+1. The term 1  zt
represents the savings set apart for consumption in the second period; Rt + 1
measures the return on that savings. The young choose the composition of their
portfolio as to maximize Rt (g; s):
gt; st = arg max
g;s
Et [Rt (g; s) + 1] : (14)
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The rst-order conditions of this problem require the expected return on the
three available assets to be equal:
fk (kt + ut) = q
 1
t = p
 1
t Et [pt+1] : (15)
Market clearing requires investment kt to be equal to its share st in total
savings, and likewise for bonds and gold, implying
kt = (1  zt) st;
bqt = (1  zt) (1  gt   st) ;
pt = (1  zt) gt = 1   (0 + qt)  kt; (16)
where equation (12) is substituted for zt and where   (1  ) b and 0 
= (1  ). An equilibrium is a quintuple gt; st; pt; kt, and qt that solves equation
(15) and the market-clearing conditions (16).
Proposition 4 The e¤ect of scal policy in the bubbly equilibrium.
1. A bubbly equilibrium exists when b  .
2. The expected price of gold pt is    b; the expected price of bonds qt is
unity.
3. The expected level of investment kt is 1  and hence does not depend on
b.
4. Investment and the price of gold are less variable for a higher b, the prices
of gold and bonds are more volatile for a higher b.5
5. Expected utility before lifting the veil of ignorance about ut reaches a max-
imum for b = min
h
1 
 ; 
i
.
Proof. see Appendix.
Bubbles cease to exist when b  , see Statement 1. Since the expected
level of investment is 1   , the expected demand for stores of value is equal
5The variability of xt refers to Var[xt], while its volatility refers to Var[lnxt].
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to . Hence, the demand for gold vanishes when the government absorbs the
excess supply of saving by issuing bonds. Furthermore, the price of gold must be
positive even for the highest investment demand, ut = u , yielding a constraint
on u .
Statement 2 says that any savings absorbed by scal policy leads to an equal
reduction in the expected price of gold. Statement 3 states that the average level
of investment in a bubbly equilibrium is equal to the rst-best, irrespective of the
level of b, compare this with Statement 1 of Proposition 3. However, investment
is less sensitive to shocks to the return on investment, the more so the higher b,
see Statement 4. Hence, this simple scal policy drives investment away from
rst-best compared to the bubbly equilibrium without scal policy. The reason
is that bonds have a xed pay out, while the future price of gold varies according
to the state of investment demand. Hence, bubbly assets are better suited to
accommodate variation in investment demand.
Nevertheless, this simple policy improves welfare compared to the equilib-
rium without scal policy, see Statement 5. The reason is that scal policy
allows transferring consumption between the two stages of life. This cannot be
achieved in a bubbly equilibrium without scal policy, since the young always
consume a share 1    of their lifetime wealth. Hence, when lifetime wealth is
constant, so will be consumption in the rst stage of life. Only the elderly adjust
their consumption in response to an investment boom or a slump, by the same
mechanism as in the economy without intertemporal substitution. When the
government conducts scal policy, the young share in the absorption of shocks
in total consumption. This is achieved by changing the lifetime wealth of the
young. When investment is low due to a low return on capital, demand for gov-
ernment bonds is high, leading to a high price of bonds and hence a low interest
rate. Hence, taxes zt will be negative, which raises lifetime wealth and hence
consumption of the young. This increase does not a¤ect their consumption when
retired, due to the fall in the return on bonds. Stated di¤erently, scal policy
uses the income e¤ect of negative taxes to boost current consumption during an
investment slump and the substitution e¤ect of a low interest rate to o¤set the
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income e¤ect in the second stage of life. Fiscal policy is therefore most e¤ective
when the share of consumption during retirement  is small. The smaller ,
the less attractive it is to let all shocks in consumption be absorbed by the el-
derly. Hence, there is a larger role for scal policy to shift consumption between
the stages of life. Contrary to the standard view of scal policy dealing with
intergenerational transfers, scal policy implements intragenerational transfers
of consumption in this world, while trade in bubbly assets implements the in-
tergenerational transfers. When 1  <  (that is, for a high average level of
ine¢ ciency ), welfare is maximized by some combination of both institutions.
If the average level of ine¢ ciency is low, welfare is maximized by putting the
full burden of adjustment on the young. Since  (the share of the consumption
when retired in lifetime wealth) is of the order of magnitude of 0.25, the average
level of ine¢ ciency must be quite high for the former to be optimal. Hence, it
is quite likely that scal policy alone should do the job in this world. Sovereign
debt would be su¢ ciently high in that case to prevent bubbles emerging. Note
also that at the critical transition 1  = , the relation between the optimal
level of b and  changes sign. For lower levels of ine¢ ciency, a higher value of 
increases the optimal value of b (which is , in that case). However, as long as
1 
 < , a greater degree of expected dynamic ine¢ ciency,  going up, should
lead to a higher level of sovereign debt.
The scal policy considered here applies an income tax to cover the decits
or surpluses from the governments debt operations. Hence, only the young
pay taxes or receive subsidies. One could generalize this policy by allowing
for a combination of income and consumption taxes, thereby spreading the tax
burden between the young and the elderly. A proper combination of income and
consumption taxes could implement the same equilibrium as is implemented by
a combination of income taxes and bubbly assets. Such a combination of income
and consumption taxes is a substitute for bubbly assets.
Even when such a combination of income and consumption taxes is avail-
able, the type of scal policy considered here is quite simple, since we constrain
b to be constant over time. Would more complicated policy rules allow for a
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further improvement of welfare? The answer is denitely yes. One can show
that a rst-best allocation would require more complicated investment and con-
sumption rules, which depend not only on ut, but also on kt 1 and ut 1. A
more complicated and activist scal policy would therefore improve welfare be-
yond the constrained optimum considered in Proposition 4. We do not present
this rst-best allocation here, since it has no analytical solution and is therefore
hard to characterize, while it contributes little to understanding the relevant
mechanisms.
Statements 2 and 4 say that scal policy stabilizes nancial markets in the
sense that it reduces both the average price of gold and its variability in absolute
terms; in relative terms, the variability of the price of gold increases. There
is less demand for gold as a store of value since sovereign debt serves as a
substitute. The only di¤erence between gold and government bonds is that the
return on gold is risky (since its future price depends on the future return on
capital), while the return on bonds is xed. However, since agents are risk-
neutral in this economy, this di¤erence is irrelevant here. This will change when
we introduce risk aversion.
4 Risk aversion and the risk-free rate
4.1 Assumptions
This section relaxes the assumption of risk-neutrality, while maintaining the
Cobb Douglas structure for intertemporal substitution:
U = (1  ) lnE
h
(cyt )
1 i1=(1 )
+  lnE
h
c1 t+1
i1=(1 )
: (17)
The parameter  is the degree of relative risk aversion. For  = 1, the utility
function simplies to
U = E [(1  ) ln cyt +  ln ct+1] :
In that case, we are back in the standard expected utility framework.
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Thus far, the riskiness of the investment in vineyards has been irrelevant.
Under risk-neutrality, the only thing that mattered was ex ante risk. Since the
realization of this factor is known at the moment of investment, the investment
itself is risk-free in an economy with only this type of risk. However, investment
is risky in reality. In an economy with risk aversion, this uncertainty should
be taken into account. We therefore extend the production function with an
additional random variable accounting for ex post risk:
f (kt; ut; vt+1) = (1 + vt+1) ln (kt + ut) ;
where vt is an i.i.d. technology shock with E[vt] = 0;Var[vt] = 2 and Cov[ut; vt+1] =
Cov[ut; vt] = 0. vt+1 and ut are independent by construction: vt+1 captures the
new information that is coming in at t + 1. If that information were to be
correlated to ut, ut would contain information about the future value of vt+1,
and hence vt+1 would not be news.6 The more substantive assumption is that
ut and vt are uncorrelated. One would surmise that the expected return on
future investment is correlated to the realized return on current investment.
Allowing for this correlation is straightforward in principle, but would mess up
subsequent derivations. Hence, it is ruled out by assumption. The production
function implies
fkt =
1 + vt+1
kt + ut
; (18)
Et [fkt] =
1
kt + ut
;
Vart [fkt] =


kt + ut
2
;
where fkt  fk (kt; ut; vt+1): the marginal productivity of capital. Note that
fkt 6=Et [fkt] due to ex post investment risk vt+1.
Fiscal policy is the same as in the previous section.
6Strictly, this argument would apply only when ut and vt would enter additively: f () =
ln (kt + ut + vt+1). Up to a second-order term, this specication is identical to the speci-
cation in the text. The latter specication is somewhat more convenient in the subsequent
analysis.
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4.2 Characterization of the equilibrium
As in the model with risk-neutrality, youngsters save 1 zt for consumption in
the second stage of life. Hence, equation (13) for ct+1 applies. Agents choose gt
and st as to maximize Et
h
c1 t+1
i1=(1 )
. Since we can factor out Et [(1  zt) ] =
(1  zt) and since only Rt depends on gt and st, the problem can be written
as
gt; st = arg max
g;s
Et
h
[Rt (g; s) + 1]
1 
i1=(1 )
: (19)
An equilibrium is a quintuple gt; st; pt; kt, and qt that solves equation (19) and
the market-clearing conditions (16).
Since a full characterization of this equilibrium is too di¢ cult a task, due
to the non-linearity of equation (19) (compare the linearity of equation 14), we
take a step back. We approximate the optimal portfolio for small deviations of
ut and vt from their expected value. In particular, we assume
 = h  0; (20)
 = h  0;
where we consider the equilibrium for the limiting case of the standard deviations
of ut and vt being small: limh ! 0. Hence: ut    = O (h) and vt = O (h).
The following proposition allows a Taylor approximation of the market returns
to the assets.
Proposition 5 The return equivalence conditions in the bubbly equilibrium read
qt   kt   ut =  k; (21)
qt   1   (ut   ) =  p;
where the symbol = implies that terms of O  h3 are ignored and where  k 
 (1  )2,  p   (  b)22, and   (1  b+ ) 1; d=db > 0 and
d p=db < 0.
Proof. see Appendix.
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The approximation applied in Proposition 5 accounts for the e¤ect of real-
izations of the ex ante and ex post risk factors ut and vt on the composition of
the asset portfolio of the young, and hence for the e¤ect of these risk factors on
asset prices. This e¤ect is of order h. The approximation also accounts for the
e¤ects of the average portfolio composition on risk premia and utility, which are
e¤ects of order h2. The approximation ignores the e¤ect of deviations from the
average portfolio on utility due to the realization of ut and vt. Since deviations
are of order h and have a utility cost of order h2, this e¤ect is of order h3. The
intuition is that the average portfolio balances the utility cost of these risks on
average, so that deviations have a higher-order e¤ect.
Equation (21) generalizes the return equivalence conditions (15) for the case
of risk aversion. The inverse risk-free rate qt minus the inverse of expected rate
of return on risky assets (either productive investments or gold) is equal to the
risk premia on holding either of these assets ( k and  p respectively). Since the
expected rate of return on gold is equal to the growth rate of the economy -which
is zero- the risk premium on holding gold implies that the expected return on
bonds is negative. This negative return is the premium for insurance against
future ex ante risk ut. While the risk premium on investment  k does not
depend on the scal policy parameter b, the risk premium on the bubbly asset
 p is decreasing in b. When the government absorbs a larger share of savings,
it has to pay a higher interest rate on its bonds (or equivalently, the price of
bonds will be lower).
An approximate equilibrium is the solution for kt; pt; and qt to the asset
return equations (21) and the market-clearing condition (16) for pt. The next
proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 6 Risk aversion and scal policy.
1. A bubbly equilibrium exists when b  .
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2. This equilibrium satises:
kt = 1     (  b) (ut   ) +  p    k; (22)
pt =   b+  (  b) (ut   ) +  k   (1 + ) p;
qt = 1 +  (ut   ) +  p:
3. The expected level of investment is lower for higher b.
4. The expected price of gold and of bonds is lower for higher b.
5. Investment and the price of gold are less variable for a higher b; the prices
of gold and bonds are more volatile for a higher b.
6. The higher the degree of risk aversion , the stronger the e¤ect of scal
policy on utility when measured at b = 0: dUdb jb=0 is increasing in .
Proof. see Appendix.
For  = 0 this approximate equilibrium is identical to the equilibrium consid-
ered in Proposition 4, compare equation (22) to equation (23) in the Appendix.
The expected value of investment deviates from that in the risk-neutral econ-
omy, depending on which has the higher risk premium: gold or investment in
vineyards. When ex ante risk dominates, risk aversion leads to higher invest-
ment, since the alternative of holding gold is more risky. Bonds and gold are
close substitutes, apart from the fact that gold is a risky asset due to next pe-
riods ex ante risk. Fiscal policy has a negative e¤ect on the price of gold: when
sovereign debt acts as an alternative store of value, the average demand for gold
goes down. However, this initial e¤ect is partly o¤set by a reduction in the risk
premium  p on holding gold, since scal policy stabilizes the price of gold.
The introduction of a simple scal policy dampens the variability of invest-
ment and the price of gold. However, scal policy is a less e¤ective means of
shifting resources between investment and consumption than trade in bubbly
assets. Hence, investment is less responsive to variations in its return. The price
of gold is less variable because government bonds are available as an alternative
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store of value. Risk aversion increases the marginal e¤ect of scal policy on
utility because it provides better insurance for the young, since part of the ad-
justment in the balance between consumption and investment is spread between
the two stages of life.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzed a world where bubbles are a means for implementing inter-
generational transfers to accommodate temporary uctuations in the return on
capital. Bubbly assets serve as an alternative store of value in the presence of
dynamic ine¢ ciency. Despite these temporary episodes of dynamic ine¢ ciency,
capital is productive on average, in the sense that average outlays of the capi-
tal sector exceed inow, a criterion very similar to that derived by Abel et.al.
(1987). In this world, a simple scal policy stabilizes the economy where the
government issues a xed quantity bonds with a xed future pay out. These
bonds serve as an alternative store of value during investment slumps, thereby
providing an instrument for intragenerational transfers and reducing the price
of bubbly assets. Variation in the price of these bonds provides a means for
adjusting consumption to investment demand. Remarkably, trade in bubbly as-
sets shifts resources between investment and consumption by intergenerational
transfers, while scal policy does this by intragenerational transfers, shifting
resources over the lifecycle between current and future consumption. These
results counter the conventional wisdom that only the government can enforce
intergenerational transfers and that scal policy is the means to implement
these transfers. For reasonable parameter values, this simple model predicts
that welfare is maximized by letting sovereign debt absorb on average all excess
saving, thereby preventing the emergence of bubbles.
Our analysis applies a Cobb Douglas intertemporal utility function, implying
an elasticity of intertemporal substitution equal to one. When the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution is less than unity, as is usually found empirically,
the e¤ect of investment slumps becomes even stronger. A fall in the return
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on capital will then lead to an increase in the budget share that the young
set apart for future consumption, putting greater strains on the ability of the
capital market to absorb these savings. Then, the scal policy has to play an
even larger role in spreading the consequences of uctuations in the demand for
capital among cohorts.
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Appendix Proofs
Proof of proposition 4
The rst equality of equation (15) can be written as: qt = kt + ut. Sub-
stitution into the market-clearing condition (16) for pt and taking expectations
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yields
pt = 1   (0 + ut)  (1 + ) kt;
Et [pt+1] = 1   (0 + )  (1 + )Et [kt+1] :
Substitution of these expression in the second equality of equation (15) yields
(kt + ut) [1   (0 + )  (1 + )Et [kt+1]] = 1   (0 + ut)  (1 + ) kt:
This equation shows that kt depends on ut and Et [kt+1] only. Hence, equation
(??) applies. Taking expectation in the nal equation yields:
0 = (1   (0 + )  (1 + )E [kt]) (E [kt] +   1) :
This equation has two solutions. The solution that sets the rst factor equal
to zero corresponds to the naive equilibrium. We focus on the second solution
corresponding to the bubbly equilibrium:
E [kt] = 1  :
Some calculation yields expressions for investment and the prices of bonds and
gold:
kt =
0   (  b)ut
0 + 
; (23)
qt =
0 + ut
0 + 
;
pt = (  b) 0 + ut
0 + 
;
where 0  1 b; pt should be positive for any state of nature for an equilibrium
to exist, proving statement 1. The expected prices of bonds and gold follow
immediately:
E [kt] = 1  ;E [qt] = 1;E [pt] =   b;
proving statements 2 and 3. Statement 4 follows from equation (23).
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Consumption for the young and the elderly satises the following:
E [cyt ] = E

 10 (1  zt)

=  10 ;
Et [ct+1] =
1  zt
qt
= 0q
 1
t + b
= 1 + 0

dqt
dut
2
2 = 1 +
0
(0 + )
2
2:
Substitution in expected welfare yields:
U =   (1  ) ln 0 +  ln
 
1 +
0
(0 + )
2
2
!
: (24)
The rst-order condition for the optimal value of b implies
) d
db
 
0
(0 + )
2
!
= 
0   
(0 + )
3 = 0:
b = 1  solves this equation. However, b   for a bubbly equilibrium to
exist, see statement 1. Hence, the optimal value is b = min
h
1 
 ; 
i
, proving
statement 5.
Proof of proposition 5
Conjecture 7 There is an equilibrium with the following properties:
1. qt   1 = O (h)
) q 1t   1 = O (h) ; zt = b (1  qt) = O (h); see equation (12).
2. fkt   1 = O (h)) f 1kt   1 = O (h)
)Et [fkt] 1  1 = kt + ut  1 = O (h); see equation (18))E[kt] = 1 +
O (h).
3. ptEt [pt+1]
 1 = 1 +  (ut   ), where  = (0 + ) 1
)Vart
h
ptEt [pt+1]
 1
i =Vart p 1t Et [pt+1] = 22
The strategy of the proof is to apply the conjecture to derive the equilibrium
and then show that this equilibrium satises the conjecture.
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Lemma 8 Let x be a random variable with E[x] = 1 +  and Var[x] = 2 with
 = O (h) and  = O (h). Then
E

x1 
1=(1 ) = 1 +   1
2

 
2 + 2

:
Proof. Dene m  ln (1 + ) and  = 1  . We have
m =   1
2
2 = O (h) ;
 = m+ 1
2
m2;
E [lnx] = m  1
2
2;
Var [lnx] = 2:
Hence
E

e ln x
1=
=

eE[ln x] +
1
2
2e2E[ln x]Var [lnx] +O
 
h3
1=
=

1 + E [lnx] +
1
2
2E [lnx]2 +
1
2
2Var [lnx] +O
 
h3
1=
=

1 + m+
1
2
2m2   1
2
2 +O
 
h3
1=
= 1 +m+ 1
2
m2   1
2
2 = 1 +   1
2

 
2 + 2

:
The conjecture and assumption (20) allow a Taylor expansion of equation
(19):
gt; st = arg max
g;s

Et [Rt (g; s)]  1
2
Et [Rt (g; s)]
2   1
2
Vart [Rt (g; s)]

:
By equation (13), we have:
Rt (g; s) = (1  s  g) q 1t + sfkt + gp 1t pt+1   1; (25)
Et [Rt (g; s)] = (1  s  g) q 1t + s (kt + ut) 1 + gp 1t Et [pt+1]  1 = O (h) ;
Vart [Rt (g; s)] = s22 + g222:
In the second line, we use equation (18) for Et [fkt] in the rst equality and the
Conjecture in the second equality. In the third line, we use equation (18) for
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Vart [fkt] (noting that kt+ut = 1+O (h) by the Conjecture) and the Conjecture
for Vart [pt+1]. Note that both 2 and 2 are O
 
h2

so that we can ignore any
higher-order terms.
The rst-order conditions for gt and st read as follows
2st = (1  Et [Rt])
 
Et [fkt]  q 1t

; (26)
22gt = (1  Et [Rt])
 
p 1t Et [pt+1]  q 1t

:
where Rt  Rt (gt; st). By the Conjecture, the market-clearing conditions (16)
can be written as
st = (1  zt) 1 kt = E [kt] +O (h) ; (27)
gt = (1  zt) 1 pt = E [pt] +O (h) :
Substitution of equation (27) into equation (26), multiplying the result by 1  
Et [Rt], and observing that 2 and 2 are O
 
h2

and Et [Rt] = O (h) (see
equation 25) yields
2E [kt] =  k = Et [fkt]  q 1t ; (28)
22E [pt] =  p = p 1t Et [pt+1]  q 1t :
Dividing the rst equation by Et [fkt] and the second by p
 1
t Et [pt+1], multiply-
ing both equations by qt, and observing that Et [fkt]
 1
= 1+O (h), ptEt [pt+1]
 1
=
1 +O (h), and q 1t = 1 +O (h), see the Conjecture, and using that both 
2 and
2 are O
 
h2

, yields equation (21).
Equations (16) (that for pt) and (21) is a system of three linear equations
with three unknowns: kt; pt; and qt. The solution to this system reads as follows:
kt = 1  + (   1) (ut   ) +  ; (29)
pt =   b+ [1   (1 + )] (ut   ) +  b;
qt = 1 +  (ut   ) +  p;
where    p    k = O
 
h2

and  b   k   (1 + ) p = O
 
h2

since  k =
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O
 
h2

and  p = O
 
h2

. Equation (29) and the Conjecture imply
Et [pt+1] =   b+  b =   b+O (h) ; (30)
ptEt [pt+1]
 1 = 1 +  (ut   ) = 1 + 1   (1 + )
  b (ut   ))
 =
1   (1 + )
  b +O
 
h2

:
The nal equation is consistent with  = (0 + )
 1. This conrms the conjec-
ture used for deriving equation (21). 
Proposition 6
Substitution of the value for  in equation (29) yields equation (22). State-
ments 1-4 follow immediately.
Expectation and variance of qt: Equation (22) implies the following:
E [qt] = 1 +  p;Var [qt] = Var

q 1t
 = 22;
E

q 1t
 = 1   p +Var [qt] = 1   p + 22;
Cov

qt; q
 1
t

= E

qtq
 1
t
  E [qt]E q 1t  =  22;
1  zt = 1 + b p + b (ut   ))
E [1  zt] = 1 + b p;Var [1  zt] = 2b222:
Expectation and variance of Rt: Substituting equation (28) in equation
(25) and using fkt =Et [fkt] (1 + vt+1) and pt+1 =Et+1 [pt+2] [1 +  (ut+1   )]
(see equation (18) and the Conjecture) yields:
Rt = (1  st   gt) q 1t + stfkt + gtp 1t pt+1   1
= (1  st   gt) q 1t + st
 
q 1t +  k

(1 + vt+1)
+gt
 
q 1t +  b

[1 +  (ut+1   )]  1;
= q 1t   1 + [gt (ut+1   ) + stvt+1] q 1t + 	;
	  (1  ) k + (  b) p = O
 
h2

;
using  p = O
 
h2

and  k = O
 
h2

in the third line. Hence
E [Rt] = E

q 1t
  1 + 	 =   p + 22 + 	 = O  h2 ;
Var [Rt] = Var

q 1t

+Var [gt (ut+1   ) + stvt+1] = 22 +  1	;
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using E[gt (ut+1   ) + stvt+1] = 0 in the rst line and Var[gt (ut+1   ) + stvt+1] =
O
 
h2

and q 1t = 1 +O (h) in the second line.
Expectation and variance of cyt and ct+1: Consumption of the young
and the elderly satises the following
0c
y
t = 1  zt = 1 + b p + b (ut   ) ;
ct+1 = (1  zt) (Rt + 1) :
Using the results on the expectation and variance of qt and Rt yields
E [0c
y
t ]
= 1 + b p;
Var [0c
y
t ]
= 2b222;
E [ct+1] = 1 + b p + E [Rt] + bCov

qt; q
 1
t
 = 1  0   p   22+ 	;
Var [ct+1] = 2b2Var [qt] +Var [Rt] + 2bCov

qt; q
 1
t
 = b (1  2b)22 +  1	:
By Lemma 8 and using the expression above, the certainty equivalents of
consumption of the young and the elderly satisfy
E
h
(0c
y
t )
1 i1=(1 ) = 1 + b1  1
2
b

 p = 1 +O
 
h2

;
E
h
c1 t+1
i1=(1 ) = 1  0   p   22+ 12b (1  2b) 22 + 12	 = 1 +O  h2 :
Equation (17) can be written as
 1U =  10 E
h
(0c
y
t )
1 i1=(1 )
+ E
h
c1 t+1
i1=(1 )
   10 ln 0;
since E
h
(0c
y
t )
1 i1=(1 )   1 and Ehc1 t i1=(1 )   1 are of order O  h2.
Hence, the rst-order condition for the optimal value of b reads:7
0 =  10
dE
h
(0c
y
t )
1 i1=(1 )
db
+
E
h
c1 t+1
i1=(1 )
db
:
Hence, the sign of dU=dbjb=0 up to an order O
 
h3

is equal to the sign of
(1  )  + 

1 +
1
2
 +   3
2


7Can be eliminated later
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using d	=db =  2 p. The second term measures the e¤ect of risk aversion.
The most unfavorable case is  =  = 1. Even in that case, the second term is
positive. This proves statement 7.
Lemma 9
d
db

 10

1 + b

1  1
2
b

 p

+ 1  0
 
 p   22

+
1
2
b (1  2b) 22 + 1
2
	

=
d
db

 (1  ) b

1  1
2
b

(  b)  0 (  b) + 0 +
1
2
b (1  2b) 

22

   p
=

 (1  ) (1  b)   (1  ) b

2  3
2
b

+  (1  2b) +    + 1
2
 (1  4b) 

22 +
2

 (1  ) b

1  1
2
b

(  b)  0 (  b) + 0 +
1
2
b (1  2b) 

32    (  b)22
For b = 0 and dividing by 2
(1  )  + 

1 +
1
2
 +   3
2


b = 0; 0 = 1
=
0@  (1  ) (1  b)   (1  ) b  2  32b+  (1  2b) +    + 12 (1  4b) +
2
  
 (1  ) b  1  1
2
b

(  b)  0 (  b) + 0 + 12b (1  2b) 

    (  b)
1A
=     + 2 (1 + ) 1  + 1
2
   2 (1 + ) 1 
= (1 + ) 1

    + 1
2


(1 + ) + 2 (1  ) 

= (1 + ) 1

 +
1
2
 +

    + 1
2


+ (1  2) 

= (1 + ) 1

(1  )  + 

1 +
1
2
 +   3
2


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